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Is Uncle Sam Inducing the Elderly to Retire?
Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Darryl R. Koehler, and Manni Yu 




Many, if not most, Baby Boomers appear at risk of suffering a major decline in their 
living standard in retirement. With federal and state government finances far too 
encumbered to significantly raise Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid benefits, Boomers 
must look to their own devices to rescue their retirements, namely working harder and 
longer. However, the incentive of Boomers to earn more is significantly limited by a plethora 
of explicit federal and state taxes and implicit taxes arising from the loss of federal and state 
benefits as one earns more. Of particular concern is Medicaid and Social Security’s complex 
Earnings Test and clawback of disability benefits. This study measures the work disincentives 
confronting those age 50 to 79 from the entire array of explicit and implicit fiscal work 
disincentives. Specifically, the paper runs older respondents in the Federal Reserve’s 2013 
Survey of Consumer Finances through The Fiscal Analyzer -- a software tool designed, in part, 
to calculate remaining lifetime marginal net tax rates.
We find that working longer, say an extra five years, can raise older workers’ sustainable living 
standards. But the impact is far smaller than suggested in the literature in large part because of 
high net taxation of labor earnings. We also find that many Baby Boomers now face or will face 
high and, in very many cases, extremely high work disincentives arising from the hodgepodge 
design of our fiscal system. A third finding is that the marginal net tax rate associated with a 
significant increase in earnings, say $20,000 per year, arising from taking a full-time or part-time 
job (which could a second job), can, for many elderly, be dramatically higher than that associated 
with earning a relatively small, say $1,000 per year, extra amount of money. This is due to the 
various income thresholds in our fiscal system. We also examine the elimination of all transfer 
program asset and income testing. This dramatically lowers marginal net tax rates facing the 
poor. Another key finding is the enormous dispersion in effective marginal remaining lifetime net 
tax rates facing seeming identical households, i.e., households with the same age and resource 
level. Finally, we find that traditional, current-year (i.e., static) marginal tax calculations relating 
this year’s extra taxes to this year’s extra income are woefully off target when it comes to 
properly measuring the elderly’s disincentives to work.
Our findings suggest that Uncle Sam is, indeed, inducing the elderly to retire.
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1. Introduction 
Ten thousand Baby Boomers are retiring each day. Many, if not most, are either poorly or very 
poorly prepared to finance retirements that may last longer then they worked. One marker of 
this problem is the financial reliance of retirees on Social Security. Social Security was designed 
to provide a basic floor to a retiree’s living standard. But it provides at least 90 percent of 
financial support to over one third of elderly households. And almost two thirds of older 
households receive at least half of their income from Social Security.1  
Unfortunately, this heavy reliance on Social Security is not due to particularly generous 
levels of Social Security benefits. Instead, it reflects the widespread failure of retirees to save 
for their retirements.  One recent survey reports that 40 percent of Baby Boomers have no 
retirement savings whatsoever.2 Data from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances show that 
median assets, including retirement accounts, of households age 55 to 64 equal just $537,225. 
Thirty-five percent of these households hold less than half of this amount and 21 percent hold 
less than one fifth of this amount. These and other dismal statistics hold dire implications for 
the economic wellbeing of Baby Boomers through time. According to Munnell, Orlova, and 
Webb (2013), over half of today’s workers, including Boomers who are now retiring, will be 
unable to maintain their living standards in retirement. 
In fact, the Baby Boomers’ retirements could well prove financially more stressful than 
those of current retirees. This is a particularly dire possibility as the financial condition of 
today’s fully retired generations is, itself, quite dire. In 2015, over one fifth of married or 






partnered retirees and almost half of single retirees received 90 percent or more of their 
income from Social Security.3 In that year, half of married or partnered retirees and three 
quarters of single retirees received half or more of their income from Social Security.4 Even 
those who initially have retirement savings are hardly set. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2012) 
report that over half of the elderly outlive their financial assets.  
The absolute level of income is another means to assess retirement finances. Roughly 
half of those now over 65 have less than $25,000 in annual income.5 This is remarkably low 
given that the current poverty threshold for a single person is $11,800.6 The Supplemental 
Poverty Measure (SPM) adjusts the official poverty measure for taxes, the value of food stamps 
and other in-kind benefits, the costs of out-of-pocket medical spending, geographic differences 
in housing expenses, and other factors. Based on this measure, one in seven people ages 65 
and older (15 percent) are poor compared to one in ten under the official measure. The SPM 
poverty rate among the elderly is far higher for minorities -- 28 percent for Hispanics and 22 
percent for African Americans.  
Why might Baby Boomers have a harder time financing their retirements than today’s 
retirees? First, many Baby Boomers, particularly those with higher incomes, can expect to live 
                                                        
3 https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/ 
4 A caveat is in order. Andrew Biggs suggests that these Social Security estimates may overstate retirees’ 








longer. Indeed, one study predicts a 10 percent increase in their length of retirement.7 Second, 
Boomers are likely, on a risk-adjusted basis, to earn lower real returns on their savings given the 
prevailing real interest rates. Today’s 30-year TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Securities) yield 
is less than 100 basis points. In 1998, when 30-year TIPS were first introduced, they yielded 
above 300 basis points.8 
Third, thanks to the legislated increase in the full retirement age, many will experience 
lower Social Security replacement rates. Fourth, the failure to index the thresholds at which 
first 50 percent and then 85 percent of Social Security benefits are subject to federal income 
taxation means that a growing number of Boomers will experience an ever higher rate of Social 
Security benefit taxation.  Indeed, these third and fourth factors imply significantly lower long-
run Social Security replacement rates over the next 15 years. Ellis, Munnell, and Eschtruth 
(2014) foresee an almost 15 percent decline in the replacement rate between now and 2030.9 
Fifth, there are now extra Medicare premiums facing those with higher incomes. 
Moreover, the thresholds at which these premiums take effect are also not inflation indexed. 
Sixth, the Affordable Care Act included two new high-income Medicare taxes. One levies an 
additional .9 percent tax on wage earnings above specified thresholds. The other applies a 3.8 
percent rate to asset income above the same thresholds. Again, these thresholds are, by law, 
explicitly and intentionally not indexed to inflation. 
                                                        
7 Ellis, C. D., Munnell, A. H., and Eschtruth, A. D. (2014), Figure 3.1. and Table 3.1. 
8 https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/tags/series?t=30-year\%3Btips 




Seventh, out-of-pocket health care costs as well as the cost of supplemental health 
insurance (major medical) policies will likely continue to rise. These out-of-pocket costs include 
increases in out-of-pocket Medicare Part B costs due to three factors -- higher Medicare 
premiums, higher Medicare Part B co-payments, and health care costs of outpatient care not 
covered by Medicare Part B.10 Indeed, rising out-of-pocket Medicare costs are projected to 
absorb roughly 2 percent more of Baby Boomers’ Social Security benefit checks by 2030.11 
Eighth, out-of-pocket co-pays and deductibles for Medicare Part D, which covers prescription 
drug expenses, are also projected to rise in real terms.12  
Ninth, current retirees can rely to a far greater extent on defined-benefit pensions than 
is the case for Baby Boomers. According to Form 5500 fillings, the U.S. Department of Labor 
indicates that since 1975, the number of participants in defined-benefit pensions has been 
constant at around 40 million. This is true despite a near doubling of total U.S. employment.13 
Meanwhile, participation in defined-contribution plans has increased from 11.5 million in 1975 
to 92 million in 2013.14  Instead, apart from Social Security, Baby Boomers will be relying 
primarily on their 401(k) and other defined-contribution retirement accounts. But participation 
in such retirement accounts has been very disappointing. Only 67 percent of Boomers have 
                                                        
10 This is in addition to the prospect of having to face the high-income Medicare premium due to inflation raising 
nominal, but not real incomes. 







retirement accounts of any kind and, as stated, many of those with retirement accounts have 
very low balances.15 
Raising Social Security’s benefit levels significantly could alleviate the Boomers’ financial 
plight as well as that of many current poor and low-income elderly. But Social Security is 32.2 
percent underfunded, i.e., it is in extremely difficult financial straits.16 What about the rest of 
the government’s fiscal enterprise? Does it have the financial wherewithal to subsidize far 
higher Social Security benefits? The answer is clearly no, according to estimates by Auerbach 
and Gale (2016) based on recent Congressional Budget Office’s projections. 17 
If the Boomers are short on regular assets, short on retirement account assets, short on 
defined benefit pensions, short on Social Security benefits, long on explicit and implicit taxes, 
and the government can’t help, Boomers have but one option to maintain their living standards 
-- earn more by working more at their current jobs, delaying their retirements, or returning to 
work if they have already retired.  
This is far easier said than done. Hour constraints at their current jobs, age 
discrimination, increasing preference for leisure, and health limitations are four major factors 
                                                        
15 http://time.com/money/4258451/retirement-savings-survey/ 
16 According to table VIF1 in the 2016 Social Security Trustees Report, the system faces a $32 trillion fiscal gap over 
the infinite horizon. This is the difference between a) the present value of the system’s projected future benefit 
outlays and b) the sum of the present value of the system’s projected future taxes and its current trust fund. The 
$32 trillion fiscal gap is 32.3 percent of the present value of projected future Social Security taxes. Consequently, 
the Social Security system is 32.3 percent under-financed. Stated differently, it needs a 32.3 percent immediate 
and permanent tax hike to continue paying promised benefits through time. Since such tax hikes appear unlikely in 
the current political environment, the system seems to be in no position to raise its expenditures even further to 
help bail out the Baby Boom generation. 
17 Auerbach and Gale estimate that the infinite horizon fiscal gap for the entire federal government is between 6 
and 11 percent of GDP – between a third and more than half of government revenues, on an annual basis, 




that limit older workers’ abilities and desire to raise their earnings through time. Older workers 
also experience age-related declines in productivity (Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1992) and, where 
applicable, negative private pension accrual associated with ongoing work (Kotlikoff and Wise, 
1989).  
But another major roadblock to higher earnings of older workers is government-
imposed work disincentives operating through the tax and transfer system, which can limit the 
willingness of the elderly to work harder and longer. These work disincentives entail both 
explicit marginal taxation, such as FICA payroll taxes, implicit taxation associated with the loss 
of government benefits, such as food stamps, and increased premiums for such benefits as a 
result of increased earnings – for example, the income-based premiums for Medicare Part B.  
This paper studies labor-supply work disincentives facing the elderly. Specifically, it 
measures the remaining lifetime marginal net tax rates of household heads and 
spouses/partners ages 50 through 79 included in the 2013 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF). The analysis is comprehensive, incorporating all major federal and state explicit 
and implicit taxes that were in place in 2013.18 Of particular concern is the potentially huge 
perceived work disincentive facing those in their early sixties associated with Social Security’s 
complex Earnings Test. We say “perceived” because Social Security’s Adjustment of the 
Reduction Factor (ARF), which occurs at full retirement age, largely undoes the Earnings Test’s 
work disincentive. But perception of the ARF seems so limited that we assume here that it is 
ignored completely.  
                                                        
18 The implicit taxation of labor earnings under Obamacare due to the loss in health insurance premium subsidies 




A. Summarizing Our Methodology  
Our methodology, at its core, is very simple. We run all SCF households through The Fiscal 
Analyzer (TFA) -- a detailed life-cycle consumption-smoothing program, developed in Auerbach, 
Kotlikoff, and Koehler (2016), which incorporates both borrowing constraints and lifespan 
uncertainty. In the course of doing its consumption smoothing, TFA determines how much each 
household can spend in present expected value, where the term expected references averaging 
over different longevity outcomes and spending encompasses all expenditures, including 
terminal bequests net of estate taxes. Suppose, for example, that earning an extra $1,000 raises 
a household’s expected present value of lifetime spending by $700. In this case, the household 
faces a 30 percent marginal net tax rate.  
TFA also measures, in present value, how much more a household will, on average, 
spend from any posited increment to the present value of its expected future earnings. Our 
lifetime marginal net tax rates are then computed by comparing the increase in the expected 
present value of spending with the increase in the expected present value of future lifetime 
earnings. If, say, an extra $10,000 of lifetime earnings permits an extra $4,000 in lifetime 
spending, the household faces a 40 percent remaining lifetime net tax rate on those additional 
earnings. 
In forming these remaining lifetime net tax rates, TFA incorporates all major federal and 
state tax-transfer programs. There are roughly 30 such programs, including many one would 
not necessarily associate with the taxation of labor supply, such as the corporate income tax, 
the estate tax, food stamps, and, as mentioned, income-related Medicare Part B premiums. 




departure from common practice. Other studies of marginal labor taxation consider at most a 
subset of the universe of fiscal programs such as the combination of the federal income and 
FICA payroll taxes. But other fiscal policies can have even larger impacts on work incentives. An 
example here is the potential dramatic loss in all Medicaid benefits by low-income workers who 
earn too much extra money.19 In the extreme, “too much” can be as little as one dollar.  
Constructing remaining lifetime rather than current-year marginal net tax rates is an 
innovation as well, but it’s also theoretically appropriate. Households don’t necessarily spend 
discrete increments to their current earnings in the year they earn them. Indeed, doing so 
would be inconsistent with the objective of consumption smoothing, which includes financing 
spending in retirement. Instead, they spread/smooth extra resources, potentially over all future 
years. Precisely how much more a household spends immediately versus in the future depends 
not just on its preferences, but also on borrowing constraints it may face over time. It also 
depends on the extent to which the household can transform current saving into future 
spending. This transformation process depends, of course, on asset-income taxation, which one 
would not typically associate with the taxation of labor supply. Yet determining the present 
expected value of extra spending arising from extra earnings, taking into account the 
household’s consumption-smoothing preferences20 and capacities to transform current saving 
                                                        
19 We count Medicare and Medicaid at their government costs notwithstanding the potential for providers to add 
on costs that participants don’t receive or for participants not to value $1 of benefits in these programs at $1 as 
discussed in Finklestein, et al. (2015).  
20 The precise nature of consumption smoothing depends on preferences.  At present, we assume all households 
wish to maintain a stable living standard per household member through time, where living standard is defined as 
discretionary spending per effective adult with an adjustment for economies in shared living. However, our 
methodology can accommodate any desired profile of relative consumption by age. The inclusion of borrowing 




into future spending, produces precisely the theoretically appropriate weighted average of 
year-specific marginal net taxes on labor supply.21 
The third non-standard feature of our analysis is the systematic incorporation of survival 
outcomes. Households don’t live for sure for specific numbers of future years. Instead, their 
members die at unpredictable dates. Thus, a 40 year-old single woman whose maximum age of 
life is 100 has 60 different survival paths to consider. If the 40 year old is married to another 40 
year old, the couple has 3,600 survival paths to consider. TFA determines spending and net 
taxation along all such paths. And its measure of the expected present value of future spending 
arising from additional earnings weighs the spending along each survival path (e.g., the 
husband dies in five years and the wife in 22 years) by the probability of that particular survival 
path. And to ensure that all resources are fully spent no matter the particular survival path, the 
present value of terminal bequests net of estate taxes arising at the end of each path is treated 
as spending. Moreover, any estate taxes associated with the gross bequests are properly 
discounted and included as part of the household’s total expected present value of remaining 
lifetime taxes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
consider alternative assumption about the desired age-consumption profile. Assuming that people wish, other 
things equal, to have lower spending when old than when young would reduced the impact of asset-income 
taxation.  This would be particularly important for the rich who have relatively more assets. On the other hand, it 
may be that the rich have relatively steeper age-consumption profiles. For purposes of this study, our objective is 
to describe the fiscal system people face assuming they share the same intertemporal preferences. This lets us 
isolate the impact of the fiscal system.  
We also assume that households know their future labor earnings and asset returns, a simplification that we hope 
to relax in future work.  
21 An example of a year-specific marginal net tax on labor supply is the amount one can spend exactly 20 years 
from now from earning an extra amount of money today assuming all the extra money was allocated solely to 




B. Summarizing Our Findings 
Our first set of findings concern the degree to which working an additional five years would 
raise the elderly’s sustainable living standard. We find that if all elderly now working were to 
continue to work for five more years, they would, on average, raise their sustainable living 
standards (annual discretionary spending per household member with an adjustment for 
economies in shared living) by roughly 5 to 8 percent depending on their age and position in the 
resource distribution. These figures can be considerably lower for older elderly and 
considerably higher – as high as 13 percent – for younger elderly.  
 Turning to work disincentives, we find high median effective marginal net remaining 
lifetime net tax rates for all elderly from 50 to 79, with the exception of elderly of lesser means 
aged 70 and above. For cohorts aged 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, and 65-69, median net tax rates 
follow a common pattern. They are in the 30 to 40 percent range for the lowest resource 
quintile rising to near or above 40 percent for the second and third quintile, and close to or 
above 50 percent for the next two quintiles. Among the richest (measured by resources – the 
sum of net worth plus human wealth) 5 percent and 1 percent, median marginal net tax rates 
can exceed 60 percent.   
We also examine the elimination of all transfer program asset and income testing. This 
dramatically lowers marginal net tax rates facing the poor and lower-resource households. The 
impact on higher resource household is, as one would expect, considerably smaller.  
We also find an enormous dispersion in effective marginal net tax rates even holding 




quintile face marginal net tax rates above 60 percent. Almost a quarter face marginal net tax 
rates below 20 percent. In the top resource quintile, a full third of elderly are in 60 percent or 
higher marginal net tax brackets, whereas 14 percent are in brackets below 40 percent.  
The above-cited marginal net tax rate results are based on separately increasing the 
household head’s and/or spouse/partner’s earnings by $1,000 for just one year. But marginal 
net tax rates can be quite different, indeed, generally higher in the context of earning more for 
longer periods of time. This is due to Medicare income limits, Social Security earnings test limits, 
and Social Security income taxation thresholds, all of which come into play if extra earnings are 
sufficiently high. For example, increasing each elderly respondent’s earnings by $10,000 for 10 
years produces particularly high effective marginal net tax rates.  
Consider, for example, the impact of this particular experiment on those aged 62 
through 65, 80 percent of whom are collecting Social Security benefits. Among the bottom-
resource quintile in this sample, nearly two in five face marginal net tax rates above 80 percent. 
Over half face marginal net tax rates above 50 percent. Among this sample’s top-resource 
quintile, over 80 percent face marginal net tax rates above 50 percent. Over half face rates 
above 60 percent.  
Many of these households face the earnings test, which reduces benefits as an 
individual’s labor market earnings increase. In our base specification, we assume that 
households perceive that the earnings test is a pure tax on benefits, e.g., that they ignore the 
increase in future benefits that result. This seems reasonable, given the opacity and complexity 




benefits that result, their marginal tax rates would generally be lower, but still high. For 
example, social security recipients between 62 and 65 (i.e., those who potentially face the 
earnings test) in the middle quintile of the resource distribution would face a lifetime marginal 
tax rate of 47.7 percent, rather than 55.1 percent. However, it is also possible that 
understanding that future Social Security benefits will increase raises lifetime marginal tax rates, 
because this will induce a loss of other, means-tested benefits, notably Medicaid.  
Our paper proceeds in section 2 with a brief literature review. Section 3 presents our 
methodology. Section 4 describes the fiscal institutions included in our study including Social 
Security’s Earning Test. Section 5 examines how much delaying retirement could mean 
financially to the elderly. Section 6 presents our remaining lifetime marginal net tax rate results, 
and Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Literature Review    
There are three types of prior studies that bear on our analysis. One type considers the general 
nature of labor supply among the elderly. The second considers the impact of policy changes on 
labor supply. And the third attempts direct measurement of marginal tax rates. 
Haider and Loughran (2010) use the Current Population Survey and the Health and 
Retirement Study to provide a broad survey of the employment of the elderly, which they 
define as those over 64. The authors show that more educated, wealthier, and healthier elderly 
are the most likely to work. But even among those who do work past 64, employment is 
marked by voluntarily or involuntarily limitations on hours worked and relatively low wages 




authors also find that a disproportionate proportion of the working elderly are self-employed. 
This arguably constitutes evidence for age discrimination.  
Forman and Chen (2008) document the general long-term decline in labor force 
participation of older men. But this trend has reversed in recent years. The labor force 
participation rate of those over 55 is now 35 percent, up from 30 percent a quarter century ago.  
Moreover, the BLS forecasts a 40 percent elderly participation rate by the early 2020s. 
Unfortunately, this projected rise appears too little, too late to fix the Baby Boomers’ 
retirement financing problem.   
While our paper is perhaps the first to integrate the effects of the broad range of fiscal 
programs on the incentives for work by the elderly, there have been significant contributions 
estimating the impact of public pension provisions on retirement incentives and retirement, 
including Kotlikoff and Wise (1989). Arguably, the most important is Gruber and Wise (1999), 
who compile analyses of the implicit tax rates on individuals over age 55 imposed by the 
various public pension provisions in several leading economies (Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States), including early retirement provisions and delayed retirement credits. They find a wide 
variation in incentives, with implicit tax rates at the early retirement age ranging from -1 
percent (in the United States) to 141 percent (in the Netherlands), and also find that there is a 
strong negative relationship between the “tax force” to retire (the sum of implicit tax rates 
between the early retirement age and age 69) and the labor force participation rate of males 




effects of other significant fiscal programs, which can have a substantial additional impact on 
work incentives. 
A number of other studies have examined how specific policies affect the labor supply 
of the elderly. Haider and Loughran (2008) and Song and Manchester (2006) reported that the 
elimination, starting in 2000, of the Earnings Test for those who at or above full retirement age 
had little influence on the elderly’s labor supply.  
Using HRS data, Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese (2003) showed that for an increase in 
health insurance premiums of $ 1,000,  men (women) aged 51 to 61 are less likely to retire early 
by 0.17 (0.24) percentage points because of lack of retiree benefits. Thus, an expanded 
Medicare program covering individuals above age 61 would increase the retirement rate, 
although the impact is small.  
Coile and Gruber (2004) analyzed the impact of two policies on the retirement rate. 
Raising the ERA (early retirement age, 62 years old) and NRA (normal retirement age, then 65 
years old) by three years would, by their estimates, lead to a decrease in the average 
retirement rate of 1 to 3 percentage points (varying because of different assumptions in the 
model) for both men and women. Moving to a more generous policy, say, a system with a 
common replacement rate of 60 percent at age 65, would increase the average retirement rate 
by 2 to 3 percentage points. 
Samwick (1998) estimated that the increase in pension coverage by 50 percent in the 
postwar period resulted in a 5 percent increase in the retirement rate of those aged 50-70, or 




maintain that main-career jobs are no longer the norm for one’s terminal job. This suggest that 
lower wages in second-career jobs may be inducing earlier retirement in the form of taking 
Social Security benefits early and then earning just up to the point at which the earnings test 
comes into play. French and Jones (2011) use HRS data to show that if the Medicare eligibility 
age were increased from 65 to 67, workers aged 60 to 69 would work 0.074 more years on 
average; and elimination of two years of Social Security benefits would lead to an additional 
0.076 years of work. 
Our method of computing lifetime marginal net tax rates is to compare the increase in 
the expected present value of spending with the increase in the expected present value of 
future lifetime earnings. Many previous papers have adopted similar concepts when calculating 
marginal tax rates, but without the detail or comprehensiveness of our forward-looking 
calculations, which incorporate the current and future effects of a broad range of tax and 
transfer programs.  
Joines (1981) estimates current marginal federal income tax rates for the US tax system, 
estimating increments of personal income tax liability using a tax schedule inferred from taxes 
paid and income received by individuals in adjacent income classes.  This is unlike our approach 
in several respects, as we incorporate actual tax systems, include transfer payments as well, 
and measure taxes and income over time, in present values. Feldstein and Samwick (1992) 
develop a method similar to ours to calculate lifetime marginal net tax rates associated with 
Social Security taxes and benefits, estimating for different types of individuals (varying by 




earnings, in present value. Our methodology extends such an approach to include a broad 
range of tax and transfer programs, not just Social Security. 
Romich (2006) uses data from residents of Wisconsin to calculate marginal tax rates, 
considering both federal transfer programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
and state programs, e.g. the Homestead Credit, a housing subsidy for low-income tax filers. 
Family spending on childcare and rents are hypothetical and the same for all families in this 
research, and calculations are based on current net taxes and income. 
The closest antecedents to this study are those by Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2002) and 
Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sluchynsky (2008). Their methodology is largely similar to ours, but 
leaves out alternative lifespan paths and also is based on stylized, i.e., hypothetical households.  
They, too, report remarkably high marginal tax rates on labor supply facing Americans at 
different levels of annual earnings. But since they are providing illustrative calculations, they 
aren’t able to evaluate the dispersion in marginal net tax rates.  
3.  Methodology, Data, and Past and Future Earnings Imputations 
The Appendix to Auerbach, et. al. (2016) describes precisely how TFA makes its calculations. But 
the basics of our approach can be captured in three equations.    
A. Methodology 
Equation (1) defines remaining lifetime resources, R, as  




where H, human wealth, is the present value of lifetime earnings and W is private net wealth.  
The measure R constitutes the lifetime resources available before taxes are paid or transfer 
payments are received.   
Equation (2) defines remaining lifetime spending, S, as 
 (2)  S = R - T,  
where T stands for the present value of remaining lifetime net taxes (taxes paid less transfer 
payments received).    
Equation (3) clarifies our calculation of a household’s remaining lifetime marginal net 
tax rate, τ.   
(3)  τ = 1 - ΔS/ΔR = ΔT/ ΔR. 
Note that equations (1) and (2) hold along any realized survival path since the present 
value of realized spending has to equal the present value of realized resources net of realized 
net taxes.22 Hence, each of the variables, R, T, and S can be viewed as expected present values, 
i.e., as weighted averages across all realized future survival paths of the path-specific realized 
present values of the variables, with the weights being the probability of the particular survival 
path occurring.  
Formula (3) is quite general. It holds no matter the nature of the increase in labor 
earnings and, thus, human wealth, H. Consequently, we can just as easily use TFA to calculate 
                                                        
22 Again, our treatment of the present value of bequests net of estate taxes as part of S and our inclusion of the 
present value of estate taxes as part of T, insures that all resources are either spent by the household or paid to 




the marginal net tax rate when H rises, say, due to a $1,000 increase in current-year earnings or 
a $20,000 increase in all current and future years earnings until retirement.  
B. Data 
As mentioned, our primary data come from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We 
also use all past waves of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to impute past Social Security 
covered earnings to our households as well as to project future covered earnings.  
Table 1 provides a count of our sample households by cohort and resource percentile.  
In total, we have 2,658 households with heads ages 50-79. As one would expect, the majority 
are in the younger age groups. Only 254 are age 75-79.  Our percentile groups are formed using 
sample household population weights and the households are distributed to the different 
resource percentiles based on their ranking across all SCF households, not just those 50-79.  
Note that the number of households in the top 5 percent and top 1 percent categories are 
larger than one would expect based on a non-stratified, random sample. But the SCF 
oversamples the rich. 
The SCF provides the value of W, the household’s (i.e., household head’s and spouse’s, if 
married) tangible wealth. All inputs from the 2013 survey are transformed into 2015 dollars and 
all provisions of all fiscal systems are from 2015.  The 2013 SCF has 6,015 families.23 Appendix B 
in Auerbach, et. al. (2016) details our sample selection and coding decisions. It makes clear that 
we attempted to include all observations in the SCF. Unfortunately, the SCF data does not 
                                                        
23 Missing data are imputed randomly and presented in five different SCF data sets called implicates.  We report 
results only for the first implicate.  But we have run our analysis with the other implicates and found no significant 




include state identifiers. We may, in future work, randomly assign households to different 
states. But in this study we assume that all SCF respondents reside in Ohio, which is 
unexceptional in terms of its state tax system and tax rates.    
A key component of our calculations involving saving and wealth is the before-tax rate 
of return on household saving. For this, we use the average return on wealth for the period 
1948-2015 based on data from the National Income and Product (NIPA) accounts and the 
Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data. The numerator for each year equals the share of national 
income not going to wages and salaries (including the portion of proprietors’ income we impute 
to labor). The denominator is aggregate wealth of the household sector plus financial wealth 
(negative if a net liability) of the federal, state and local government sectors. The resulting 
average real before-tax rate of return is 6.371 percent. To calculate nominal rates of return, we 
assume an inflation rate of 2 percent. 
C. Imputing Future and Past Labor Income 
To form H, the present expected value of future labor earnings, we need to forecast, for each 
individual, a trajectory of future labor earnings. In addition, we need to backcast past earnings 
in order to calculate Social Security covered earnings, which enter into the calculation of future 
Social Security benefits.  
In forecasting and backcasting labor earnings, we statistically match Current Population 




CPS by age, sex, and education,24 and use successive waves to estimate annual earnings growth 
rates by age and year for individuals in each sex and education cell. These cell growth rates are 
used to “backcast” each individual’s earnings history. We also project future earnings for each 
particular cell defined by age and demographic group, until age 67 (when we assume 
individuals claim retirement benefits) by using average historical growth rates by age, net of 
average overall earnings growth and plus an assumed future annual general real growth rate of 
1 percent.25  
These past and future growth rate estimates are for cell aggregates and do not account 
for earnings heterogeneity within cells. To deal with such heterogeneity, we assume that 
observed individual deviations in earnings from cell means are partially permanent and partially 
transitory, based on an underlying earnings process in which the permanent component 
(relative to group trend growth) evolves as a random walk and the transitory component is 
serially uncorrelated. We also assume that such within-cell heterogeneity begins in the first 
year of labor force participation.   
In particular, suppose that, at each age, for group i, earnings for each individual j evolve 
(relative to the change in the average for the group) according to a shock that includes a 
permanent component, p, and an iid temporary component, e. Then, at age a (normalized so 
that age 0 is the first year of labor force participation), the within-group variance will be 
𝑎𝜎𝑝2 + 𝜎𝑒2. Hence, our estimate of the fraction of the observed deviation of individual earnings 
                                                        
24 In cases where cells have fewer than 25 observations, we merge cells for adjoining ages and assume that 
average growth rates for these merged cells hold for all included ages. 





from group earnings, �𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑎 − 𝑦�𝑖𝑎�, that is permanent is 
𝑎𝜎𝑝2
𝑎𝜎𝑝2+𝜎𝑒2
. This share grows with age, as 
permanent shocks accumulate. Using this estimate, we form the permanent component of 
current earnings for individual j, 𝑦�𝑖𝑗𝑎 , 
(4)  𝑦�𝑖𝑗𝑎 = 𝑦�𝑖𝑎 +
𝑎𝜎𝑝2
𝑎𝜎𝑝2+𝜎𝑒2







and assume that future earnings grow at the group average growth rate.26 Further, we make 
the simplifying assumption that the permanent and temporary earnings shocks have the same 
variance, a reasonable one based on the literature (e.g., Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1995, and 
Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011), so that (4) reduces to: 







For backcasting, we assume that earnings for individual j were at the group mean at age 
0 (i.e., the year of labor force entry), and diverged smoothly from this group mean over time, so 
that the individual’s estimated earnings t years prior to the current age a are: 


















That is, for each age we use a weighted average of the estimate of current permanent earnings, 
deflated by general wage growth for group i, and the estimated age-a group-i mean also 
deflated by general wage growth for group i, with the weights converging linearly so that as we 
                                                        





go back we weight the group mean more and more heavily, with a weight of 1 at the initial age, 
which we assume is age 20.  
D. Intended and Imputed Ages of Retirement and Social Security Collection In the SCF  
Table 2 provides the distribution of retirement ages specified in our data for the different age 
cohorts.  In forming this table and producing our results, we use respondents’ stated retirement 
ages and assume they stop working entirely thereafter. For those who say they will never retire, 
we set their retirement age to the larger of a) their current age plus 3 years and b) age 70. All 
working respondents are required by the SCF to answer the survey’s question concerning their 
intended age of retirement. A relatively high share of the sample’s individuals was already 
retired at the time they were interviewed by the SCF. Among those still working a remarkably 
small share specify ages 62 or 66 for the ages at which they will retire.  Indeed, among those 
between 50 and 59 who are still working, over half say they will either retire at or after age 70 
or never retire. Either the respondents chose not to take this question seriously or they have, as 
a group, highly unrealistic expectations about how long they will be able or want to work. This 
may help explain why so many Baby Boomers appear so poorly financially prepared for 
retirement. Nonetheless, we use respondents’ projected retirement age to specify, as indicated 
above, when respondents entirely stop earning money.  
 Unfortunately, the SCF does not ask respondents their intended dates for collecting 
their Social Security retirement benefits. As a result we need to impute these dates. Our 
method is very simple. For each individual, we set the age of retirement benefit collection at 




We also set the ages for collection of spousal benefits and widows benefits at the respondent’s 
full retirement age. Unfortunately, the public-use SCF sample does not tell us if single 
respondents are divorced, widowed, or never married. As we have no information on the 
former spouse in the case of divorcees (whose ex may or may not be alive) or the decedent 
spouse in the case of widows, we are forced, in this study, to treat all single respondents as 
never married. We do assume that married spouses file for their spousal benefits starting at full 
retirement age and that married spouses who become widowed start receiving their widow’s 
benefit at full retirement age. These collection ages are then subject to override by Social 
Security’s deeming provisions.27  
The SCF can be used to determine the ages that respondents who are already collecting 
first began collecting their retirement benefits.  Table 3 presents these data.  Note that almost 
half of respondents report taking their retirement benefit as soon as it became available, at age 
62. Almost one quarter took it at 65.  All told, over 90 percent of respondents receiving Social 
Security took their retirement benefit at or below the current full retirement age, 66, and, 
obviously, well before age 70.  This appears to be due, in part, to the inability of households to 
make it financially to 70 without Social Security. This liquidity constraint can, itself, reflect a 
decision by such households to stop working because they believe that, due to the Earnings 
Test, it doesn’t pay.  This assumes, of course, that they are unaware of the Adjustment of the 
Reduction Factor.  Another explanation is that older Americans don’t appreciate longevity risk 
                                                        
27 For example, a couple who are both 55 year olds in 2013 who indicate that they will take their retirement 
benefits at 70 will, under the assumption that they both take their spousal benefit at 66, be forced to take their 
retirement benefit at 66 as well. This reduces or raises their lifetime benefits depending on their relative sizes and 




and, instead, assume they will die “on time” (i.e., at their life expectancies) or earlier.  As a 
result, they can easily undervalue the far higher benefits available from waiting to collect 
benefits at higher ages.  
E. Projecting Mortality 
A key element of our calculations is uncertain lifetimes, based on assumed mortality 
probabilities that vary by age, sex and, of particular relevance for our calculations, the level of 
resources. We utilize estimates from the recent study by the National Academies (2015), which 
modeled mortality as a function of age, sex, birth year and income quintile, where income was 
measured using a truncated AIME calculation based on earnings between ages 40 and 50 and 
the variable for couples was set equal to the sum of spouses’ truncated AIME divided by the 
square root of 2.28 We follow the same procedure to sort households to determine their 
quintile for purposes of assigning mortality profiles, except that we use a full AIME measure, 
imputed to age 60 in cases where individuals have only partial earnings records. Mortality is 
assumed to begin starting at age 55. 
 Note that the resource definition used for assigning mortality profiles is different from 
that used in our analysis below, for example not including wealth and being based on average 
earnings until age 60, rather than resources as of the individual’s current age. However, there 
should be considerable overlap between the two methods of classification. 
                                                        




4.  Federal and State Fiscal Institutions 
Table 4 lists the roughly 30 different fiscal institutions included in our analysis. The major 
elements in the table that concern the elderly are the federal personal income tax, Ohio’s state 
income tax, Ohio’s sales tax, the federal corporate income tax, the FICA tax, Social Security 
benefits, Medicaid benefits, Medicare benefits, Medicare Part B premiums, Food Stamps, 
Supplemental Security Income, and disability benefits.29   
As the table shows, the federal personal income tax has many components that 
separately influence the rate of marginal net taxation. These components include progressive 
tax rates, the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Alternative Minimum Tax, preferential taxation of 
capital gains and dividends, the taxation of Social Security benefits, Medicare’s new high-
income payroll and asset-income taxes, and the phase out of deductions and exemptions.  
Figure 1 shows a breakdown of average lifetime resources, taxes, and transfer payments 
by resource quintile. The 4th quintile, for example, references all households ranked from 61st to 
80th in the distribution of remaining lifetime resources (the present value of remaining lifetime 
earnings plus household net wealth). All observations are pooled in this figure. The Appendix 
presents comparable figures, but for the specific cohorts. Figure 1 shows the relative and 
absolute importance of different types of assets and sources of income in determining overall 
resources.  It does the same for the components of taxes and transfer payments. What we see 
                                                        
29 We ignore housing subsidies, which are also income-tested because, based on our understanding, subsidized 
apartments and other forms of housing subsidies are limited in number and are allocated on a waiting-line basis. 
While the incidence of the corporate income tax may fall on workers to a large extent, the corporate income tax 
represents a marginal tax assessed on additional asset income since any given worker’s addition saving (arising 
from additional earnings) will entail receive a lower return due to the corporate tax, but that worker’s work and 




is largely what we expect. Here are five examples. First, a disproportionate share of the assets 
of the top 20 percent are represented by regular assets as opposed to retirement accounts or 
home equity. Second, the poorest 20 percent of households have dramatically lower assets, on 
average, than households in other cohorts. Third, self-employment income is particularly 
important for the top quintile. Fourth, federal income taxes matter far more for higher resource 
quintiles. And, fifth, Social Security and Medicare benefits are the major transfer payments for 
all resource quintiles with Medicaid benefits also playing a significant role for the poor.  
Although Figure 1 tells us about averages in the data developed and used in this study, it 
does not directly bear on the main question of this study – the size of marginal effective 
remaining lifetime net tax rates.  The reason is simply that our tax and transfer system is highly 
non-linear. Consequently, a tax or transfer that is quite small, on average, can have a huge 
impact on marginal work incentives.  
A. Social Security’s Earnings Test 
Of particular interest and concern when it comes to the elderly’s incentives to work is Social 
Security’s Earnings Test. For those who file for their Social Security benefits early (before full 
retirement age, currently 66), which represents roughly over three quarters of retirees, the 
Earnings Test can increase their effective marginal net tax rate by up to 50 percentage points.  
We say “can” for four reasons. First, during the year one reaches full retirement age 
benefits are reduced 33 cents, not 50 cents for each additional dollar earned, and only through 
the day one reaches full retirement age. Second, earnings have to exceed an exempt amount 




between age 62 and January 1st of the year they will reach full retirement age and $41,880 
between January 1st of the year they will reach full retirement age and the day they reach full 
retirement age.  
Third, Social Security’s Adjustment of the Reduction Factor, if understood, undoes the 
labor supply tax Associated with the Earnings Test. It does so at full retirement age by raising all 
of the specific type of benefits lost under the Earnings Test to fully offset, on an actuarial basis, 
the Earnings Test’s confiscation of those benefits.  Indeed, those earning enough to lose all 
their benefits of type X in a given year may face no marginal taxation from the claw back of 
Social Security benefits.   
Fourth, for those who understand Social Security’s Adjustment of the Reduction Factor 
(ARF) provision, the claw back may, thus, only be temporary.  We emphasize the world “may” 
for two reasons. First, for households that are borrowing constrained, but do understand the 
Adjustment of the Reduction Factor, the value of receiving higher benefits in the future will not 
fully offset the loss of benefits now as the marginal utility of consumption in the present 
exceeds that in the future.  Second, the ARF only raise the specific benefit that was lost due to 
the Earnings Test. For those who will receive a different benefit after full retirement age (for 
example a widows benefit rather than a retirement benefit) having a higher benefit that one 
isn’t actually receiving is of no avail to those who were hit by the Earnings Test.30  
                                                        
30 One additional factor in our calculations is that the ARF is not actuarially fair on a discounted present value basis, 
given the before-tax rate of return used in our calculations.  The ARF is based on an underlying roughly 3 percent 
real return. But our TFA model uses the average return on assets in the economy in the Post War period, which, as 
discussed in Auerbach, et. al. (2016), is 6.371 percent.  This return has been remarkably stable, exhibiting a 




The ARF is, however, sufficiently complex that very few workers subject to the Earnings 
Test appear to understand it. As a consequence, many workers who take Social Security early 
and are subject to the Earnings Test may perceive they are facing either a 50 percent or a 33 
percent marginal Social Security tax when, in fact, their effective marginal tax arising from the 
Earnings Test is zero. This concern about misperception of the Earnings Test is supported by the 
propensity of workers potentially subject to the Earnings Test to bunch their earnings at or just 
below the Earnings Test exempt amounts.31   
Workers can, of course, avoid the Earnings Test entirely by simply waiting until full 
retirement age to file for their benefits. But doing so raises another question of perception. 
Many workers who become eligible for Social Security may not realize that waiting to collect 
their benefits will fully, indeed, in most cases, more than fully compensate them for foregoing 
benefits in the short run. They may not be aware or understand the actuarial adjustments 
associated with waiting to collect. They may not realize that the higher benefits from waiting 
are real not nominal, i.e., they are above and beyond future adjustments for inflation.  And they 
may not understand the nature of actuarial calculations. In this regard, many workers appear to 
focus on their life expectancy, not their maximum age of death in considering their future 
longevity.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
used to form the ARF means that, in our calculations, that the ARF offsets somewhat less than half of the Earnings 
Test, even assuming that it is correctly perceived by workers (i.e., that the fourth caveat raised above doesn’t hold). 




Social Security encourages this behavior by referencing life expectancy in different parts 
of its website and by providing a life expectancy calculator on their website.32 For those 
convinced they will die at their life expectancy, waiting to collect a higher benefit will be 
perceived as actuarially unfair even when it’s fair or more than fair. This misperception will lead 
workers to take their benefits as soon as possible at which point the complete or partial 
misperception of the ARF coupled with misperception of the AFR’s real actuarial adjustments 
can leave workers in 33 to 50 percent higher perceived marginal tax brackets. Marginal tax 
rates of 33 to 50 percent represent a significant work disincentive on their own. But they come 
on top of other explicit and implicit marginal taxes.  
In our basic calculations we assume that the elderly do not understand the AFR and we 
do not, therefore, incorporate it in our results. We do, however, show the sensitivity of our 
results to this assumption and, thereby, the potential impact of the Earnings Test on work 
disincentives.  
5. How Much Can The Elderly Raise Their Living Standards By Working More? 
As a starting point for our analysis, we note the findings of Butrica, et. al. (2006), who use the 
Urban Institute’s Dynamic Simulation of Income Model (DYNASIM) to study the financial impact 
of the elderly’s working longer.33 Their study suggests that workers’ living standards can be 
                                                        
32 www.ssa.gov/planners/lifeexpectancy.html 
33 DYNASIM, the tool that Butrica, et. al. (2006) uses, ages a starting self-weighting sample of about 100,000 
individuals from the 1990 to 1993 Survey of Income and Program Participation in yearly increments to 2050. 
Parameters in DYNASIM are estimated from longitudinal data sources. DYNASIM can project retirement age and 





raised by over 50 percent based on just five additional years of work from age 50 onward.  To 
quote their study,  
 
Workers, according to DYNASIM3, could increase their annual income by an average of 5 
percent from age 50 onward for one additional year of work, and 25 percent for five 
additional years of work. 
 
If these findings are accurate, policies that discourage work by the elderly would be of far 
greater concern than many analysts, including us, have assumed. Consequently, we felt it 
important to repeat their analysis.  Our results are shown in tables 5 and 6.  The sample used in 
these tables encompasses those aged 50-79 who are currently working. In the exercise, we 
extend the retirement age of both the household head and spouse/partner by either one or five 
years and assume workers earn the amounts projected based on our above-described method. 
Even though many if not most respondents do not likely understand the ARF, we include it in 
our analysis since the household will end up with this extra income and our goal here is to 
understand all the returns from working. The tables include working single households as well 
as households with couples where at least one spouse/partner is working. Hence, the weighted 
average percentage increase in lifetime spending reflects only what working households can 
expect, on average, if they postpone their retirements. For all households, including non-
working households, in any given cell the percentage increase in spending will be smaller.  
Among those ages 60-64, the percentage gain for working 5 years more is 15.7 percent 
for those in the lowest quintile, 10.0 percent for those in the third quintile, 7.6 percent for 




figures for all households (not just those with at least one worker) are 8.1 percent, 7.9 percent, 
6.4 percent, and 3.8 percent.  
In the case of a one-year retirement extension, the results for the 60-64 year-old cohort 
for the same four percentile groups are 6.2 percent, 2.6 percent, 1.9 percent, and 1.2 percent.  
The percentage increases averaged across all households in this cohort are 3.2 percent, 2.1 
percent, 1.6 percent, and .9 percent.  
If we consider a younger cohort, those 50-54, the results from working five additional 
years, for the lowest, middle, and highest quintiles and the top 1 percent, are 8.9 percent, 9.7 
percent, 8.2 percent, and 7.7 percent among working households,. Since most households in 
this age range are working, the results averaged across all households are not much smaller.  
These percentage increases, even considering just working households, are much 
smaller than Butrica, et. al. (2006) report.  Indeed, across all cells in Tables 5 and 6, the largest 
percentage increase in the remaining lifetime discretionary spending is 20.0 percent for the 
lowest quintile in the age 70-74 cohort. Part of the reconciliation in the two sets of results is 
that Butrica, et. al. (2006) are considering gross income, not net income or discretionary 
spending. Discretionary spending is, of course, financed out of net remaining lifetime resources.  
This would make their percentage changes larger than ours. Another reason their changes 
should be larger is that discretionary spending is financed, in part, out of household assets, 
both regular and retirement account assets. Consequently, any given percentage change in 
labor earnings should have a smaller percentage impact on discretionary spending to the extent 




spending are lower for cohorts in higher resource percentiles. A third reason for why we are 
finding a smaller percentage change in living standard is our inclusion of all transfer payments. 
The fourth and probably most important reason for the differences in results is that Butrica, et. 
al. (2006) assume that all extra funds earned are saved through retirement and then used to 
purchase an annuity. 34 
6. The Elderly’s Rates of Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Taxation 
We first consider median remaining lifetime marginal net tax rates arising from a $1,000 
increase in current-year earnings. This is on top of our baseline projection of future earnings for 
the workers. Table 7 show the results, by resource quintile and the top 5 and top 1 percentiles, 
for the entire sample as well as for specific cohorts. These and all other medians were 
constructed taking into account SCF household sample weights.  
The median rates in most cells are remarkably high. Take, for example, those aged 55-59 
in the third resource quintile. Their median marginal net tax rate is 46.2 percent, meaning that 
half those in this cell face even greater work disincentives. Or consider those age 70-74 in the 
highest quintile. Their median marginal net rate is 57.6 percent. At the very top end of the 
resource distribution, median rates exceed 60 percent for all age groups except the oldest. The 
basic pattern of median rates rising with resources holds for all age groups except those 75-79, 
where there is a significant drop in going from the first to the second quintile, but with median 
rates rising thereafter for higher resource groups.  
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Tables 8 and 9 repeat Table 6’s exercise except their increments to current-year 
earnings are $10,000 and $20,000, respectively.35 These larger earnings increments incur higher 
median marginal net tax rates.  For example, the just-mentioned age 55-59 third quintile 
median marginal net rate is 49.3 percent in Table 9 compared to 46.2 percent in Table 7. And 
the top 1 percent of those 75-79 have a 64.2 percent median marginal rate in Table 9 compared 
with a 59.3 percent median rate in Table 7.   
These particular cell differences are small. But for other cells the differences in marginal 
net taxation from a $1,000 increase in current earnings versus a $20,000 increase can be major. 
Take, for instance, the lowest age 50-54 quintile. Its median marginal net tax rate is 38.0 
percent in the case of a $1,000 earnings increment and 77.4 percent in the case of a $20,000 
earnings increment. This reflects the loss of the poor’s Medicaid benefits associated with 
earning so much more. Loss of Medicaid also plays a role in raising the median rate of 32.7 
percent for those in the lowest quintile aged 60-64, arising from a $1,000 increment to current 
earnings to 82.5 percent, arising from a $20,000 increment. But the Earnings Test also comes 
into play for many respondents between 62 and 64 who are collecting Social Security because it 
puts them above the threshold at which the Earnings Test’s 50 percent marginal rate comes 
into play. Figures 2 and 3, which consider $1,000 and $20,000 earnings increments lasting for 1 
year provide a good snapshot of the level of median marginal net tax rates facing all those aged 
50 – 79.  
                                                        




Table 10 considers the same increments to earnings, but lasting not one year, rather 
through retirement. Here, again, we consider median marginal net tax rates. But to economize 
on space, we group all age groups together. The table shows that for those in the lowest 
quintile, the median marginal net tax rate can be dramatically higher depending on the length 
of time the higher earnings continue. For example, a $10,000 increase for 1 year produces a 
median net tax rate of 40.8 percent. But the same $10,000 increase, if extended through 
retirement, produces an 82.5 percent marginal net rate! And this prohibitively high rate is just 
the median, meaning that half of the elderly in the lowest quintile lost more than 82.5 cents on 
the dollar were they to earn an extra $10,000 through retirement! 
A. Marginal Net Taxation Facing Social Security Recipients 
For Social Security recipients, the tax rates embodied in the Social Security system’s rules are of 
paramount importance. As already discussed, though, these rules are both complex and poorly 
explained, meaning that the impact on work and retirement incentives depends very much on 
how these rules are perceived.   
 To illustrate the importance of these perceptions, Table 11 provides alternative 
estimates of median lifetime tax rates exclusively for Social Security recipients, aged 62-65 – 
individuals who could face the earnings test by earning additional current labor income.  The 
first three columns of the table repeat the calculations from Tables 7-9 for Social Security 
recipients. The remaining three columns provide marginal tax rates under the alternative 
assumption that individuals correctly perceive how ARF works. As one would expect, estimated 




current benefits through the earnings test is in good part offset by earning higher future 
benefits.  
For example, those in the middle quintile earning an additional $20,000 in the current 
year would face a median marginal tax rate of 55.1 percent if ARF is not taken into account, but 
47.7 percent if ARF is correctly understood.  What is initially surprising, though, is that marginal 
tax rates may increase when the effects of ARF are included in the calculation. This can be seen 
by comparing marginal tax rates for those in the lowest quintile earning an additional $20,000, 
whose median marginal tax rate rises from 74.7 percent to 77.2 percent. Such low-resource 
individuals can face higher marginal net tax rates from earning extra income with the ARF 
turned on and assumed to be fully understood because the extra ARF income leaves them 
(prior to earning more money) close to Medicaid and other means-tested, transfer-payment 
thresholds.  
 As discussed above (see footnote 28), the ARF, though conceived to provide an actuarial 
offset to the earnings test, will provide only a partial offset to the extent that actual rates of 
return exceed those on which the ARF adjustment is based, as is the case for our assumed rate 
of return. As an alternative, one can consider the impact of simply eliminating the earnings test, 
which is an equivalent – in present value – to an exact actuarial offset, including one that would 
take into account differential mortality across income groups.  
Table 12 provides estimates of marginal tax rates for Social Security recipients aged 62-
65, for our base case (with no ARF) and under the assumption that the earnings test is 




columns show median marginal tax rates assuming the earnings test is eliminated. These 
columns can be compared to the corresponding columns of Table 11 to see how much of a 
difference the alternative assumptions about the earnings test (ARF vs. elimination) make.   
In making this comparison, it is important to keep in mind that while both ARF and 
eliminating the earnings test increase the present value of resources, relative to an earnings 
test without ARF, the timing of their adjustments differs. ARF offsets the current reduction in 
benefits caused by the earnings test with an increase in future benefits, while eliminating the 
earnings test simply increases current benefits.  This difference is what underlies the big 
difference in median marginal tax rates for the lowest income quintile earning an additional 
$20,000 in the current year. While ARF actually increases the perceived marginal tax rate (as 
discussed above), eliminating the earnings test reduces the marginal tax rate, from 74.7 percent 
to 54.7 percent, because individuals in this group will be much less subject to increased future 
benefit loss.  
For higher-resource groups, benefit phase-outs are less important; for these groups, 
eliminating the earnings test typically reduces median tax rates slightly more than incorporating 
ARF, because by our assumptions the ARF is not fully actuarially fair. For example, individuals in 
the highest quintile earning an additional $20,000 experience a decline in their median 
marginal tax rate from 66.8 percent to 59.4 percent under elimination of the earnings test, but 




B. The Impact of Eliminating All Income and Asset Tests of Transfer Programs 
Table 13 shows how marginal net tax rates would look were all income and assets test of all 
transfer programs jointly eliminated. The table considers a one-year $20,000 increase in 
earnings and can be directly compared with table 9.  
As one would expect, median rates are dramatically lower for poor and lower-income 
households. Take the cohort age 50-54. The first quintile median marginal net tax rate is 77.4 
percent with the transfer program marginal taxation included (i.e., as reported in table 9). It’s 
31.5 percent without (as reported in table 13). For the third quintile in this cohort, the two 
rates are 47.4 percent and 41.1 percent. Or consider those 60-64. The first quintile’s table 9 
median rate is 82.5 percent, but it’s only 27.6 percent in table 13. For those in this age range in 
the third quintile, the median rate falls from 47.0 percent to 39.2 percent.  
C. The Dispersion of Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates 
Figure 4 and table 14 show the remarkable dispersion of remaining marginal net tax rates 
across all SCF sample respondents (i.e., household heads and, where applicable, their spouses 
or partners) aged 50 to 79. The figure and table consider the marginal lifetime net tax rates 
arising from a $20,000 increase in earnings for one year. The figure and table are limited to 
observations with marginal tax rates ranging from zero to 200 percent. Dispersion results for 
other hypothetical increases in earnings lasting 1 or more years are quite similar. Note from the 
figure that most of the very high marginal net tax rates are those of respondents who are 




The fact that the median remaining lifetime net tax rates range from high to very high 
may be expected given the seemingly independent design of so many tax systems and 
subsystems as well as so many transfer payments programs, all of which incorporate implicit 
tax schedules through the income-testing of the benefits they provide. But what we find 
remarkably surprising is the enormous variation in marginal net tax rates among households 
within the same cohort and quintile of the resource distribution.  
Cohort-specific tables in the Appendix show that the dispersion holds within each age 
group. But the dispersion tends to be much greater at lower resource levels. Anyone familiar 
with optimal tax theory would likely view the dispersion in marginal net tax rates displayed in 
Figure 4 with chagrin. It appears to be strongly at odds with what that body of theory 
recommends. In particular, it does not recommend net tax rates so high as to effectively lock 
large numbers of older workers, particularly, the poor and the rich, out of the work force.  
Consider, for example, the implications for those 60-64 of earning $20,000 more for one 
year. Among the lowest quintile, 51 percent will lose more than 80 cents of every extra dollar 
earned, 8 percent will lose between 61 and 80 cents, and 7 percent will lose between 51 and 60 
cents.  Hence, two thirds of the poorest members of this cohort that face marginal net tax rates 
above 50 percent and over half face marginal net tax rates above 80 percent. Among those in 
the top quintile, 39 percent are in a 61 to 80 percent marginal net tax bracket and 33 percent 
are in a 51 to 60 percent marginal net tax bracket.  Hence, almost three quarters are in 




Very high marginal net taxation holds for a significant minority of the poor of all cohorts. 
It’s also present for many of the upper middle class and the rich – at all ages. For example, take 
those 70-74. Sixty-five percent of those in the fourth quintile face a marginal net tax rate 
between 51 and 60 percent on earnings of $20,000 in the current year. In the top quintile of 
this cohort, 83 percent lose more than half the additional $20,000 and almost half lose between 
61 percent and 80 percent.  
D. Maximum and Minimum Marginal Net Tax Rates 
Another way to assess the variance in marginal net tax rates is to consider the maximum and 
minimum rates.  Tables 15 and 16 present these values again for the case of a one-year, 
$20,000 increase in earnings. The highest rate recorded in the Table 14, which presents 
maximums, is 627.9 percent. This for a respondent whose household is in the lowest resource 
quintile in the cohort 65-69.  
Table 16’s minimum marginal net tax rates are far smaller, but many of the figures are 
still fairly high. For example, in the top quintile of those 55-59, the lowest rate is 32.5 percent. 
The table’s lowest rate is 8.8 percent – the minimum marginal net tax rates for the lowest 
quintiles ages 50-54 as well as 65-69.  Thus, in the case of the poorest 65-69 year olds, the 
marginal net tax rates range from 8.8 percent to 627.9 percent – quite a range!  
The household with a marginal lifetime net tax rate of 8.8 percent is a single woman, 
age 66, with a young child (age 5) in her care.  Her primary source of income is Social Security, 
but she also receives Food Stamps and Supplemental Security Income.  She owns a modest 




child in her home.  If she earns an additional $20,000 in the current year, her federal taxes will 
decrease. Indeed, she’ll receive a federal income tax refund due to the Child Tax Credit and the 
Earned Income Tax Credit.  Her Food Stamp benefits will, however, be reduced in the current 
year but that is more than offset by the refund, leaving her with a small positive marginal net 
tax rate.  
The household with the marginal lifetime net tax rate of 627.9 percent is a married 
couple whose husband is age 65 and wife is age 61.  The husband is currently collecting Social 
Security and has modest self-employed income of roughly $8,000 per year. The wife is disabled 
and receives Social Security Disability Income.  They own a modest home with no 
mortgage.  Their high marginal tax rate is due to the loss of their Medicaid benefits in the years 
prior to the wife reaching age 65.  The additional $20,000 in the current year increases their 
Modified Adjusted Gross Income, which determines their Medicaid eligibility.  The additional 
labor earnings in the current year eliminate their current-year Medicaid eligibility. But, since 
they save a portion of the additional income and, as a result, have more assets in asset income, 
after the first year, they also lose Medicaid eligibility in future years. Indeed, they lose it for 
four years in a row.  
E. Comparing Current and Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates 
Table 17 presents current-year marginal net tax rates defined as the change in this year’s net 
taxes divided by the increment to earnings -- $1,000 in this case. The figures in this table should 
be compared with those in Table 7, reproduced here in red, which also consider a one-year, 




over time. Accordingly, the present values of their net taxes exceed what they pay in the 
current year.  
The differences are strikingly large. Consider the 31.6 percent median lifetime marginal 
net tax rate for the lowest quintile age 50-79 (shown in red). This is over twice the 14.8 percent 
median current year net tax rate (shown in black). Or take those 60-64 in the third quintile. 
Their remaining lifetime marginal net tax rate, shown in red, is 41.6 percent. But their current-
year marginal net tax rate is only 31.1 percent.  A third example is the richest 1 percent of those 
ages 70-74. Their median remaining lifetime marginal net tax rate is 67.4 percent, far higher 
than the 43.6 percent rate current-year net tax rate.  
7. Conclusion   
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the marginal net taxation of the elderly by 
running observations from the 2013 Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
through The Fiscal Analyzer, a life-cycle consumption-smoothing program specially designed to 
incorporate all major federal and state fiscal programs including the federal corporate income 
tax, personal federal and state income taxes, FICA taxes, state sales taxes, estate taxes, Social 
Security benefits, Social Security’s Earnings Test, Food Stamps, Social Security disability benefits, 
Medicare benefits, Medicare Part B premiums, and Medicaid benefits.    
Our findings show that older workers typically face high, very high, or remarkably high 
marginal net taxation on their extra earnings.  Work disincentives are largest for those at the 




the marginal net tax rate facing those earning an extra $20,000 in the current year and those 
earning an extra $1,000 can be dramatic.  
Another central finding is that the marginal net tax on earning any given amount, but for 
a longer period of time is no higher than earning extra money over a shorter period of time. 
Finally, we find that marginal current-year net tax rates are very poor proxies for the more 
appropriate lifetime measures.  
We also find a far smaller impact on marginal net tax rates than expect arising from the 
Earnings Test because either eliminating it or making workers cognizant of the ARF leaves them 
with higher incomes and thus closer to Medicaid and other transfer payment thresholds. In 
other words, lessening the importance of one marginal net tax can enhance the strength of 
others. On the other hand, eliminating all earnings and asset tests of transfer programs leads to 
dramatically lower median marginal effective remaining lifetime net tax rates for poor and 
lower-income households.  
Marginal net tax rates levied on the elderly can vary enormously even within a resource 
quintile for a given cohort. This is to be expected given that individual fiscal policies have not 
been designed with their overall impacts on work incentives in mind, but is quite at odds with 
the lessons of optimal tax theory. 
A final key finding is that the current-year marginal net tax rates can dramatically 
understate the work disincentives facing the elderly because they incorrectly assume that all 




We conclude by addressing the question posed in this paper’s title, Is Uncle Sam 
Inducing the Elderly to Retire? Based on the work disincentives Uncle Sam imposes on the 
elderly, the answer seems clearly to be yes. But an open question is the extent to which the 
elderly correctly perceive these disincentives. Indeed, given the complexity and interactions of 
our fiscal system and the heretofore reliance on current-year marginal net tax rates, it’s hard to 
believe that policymakers, themselves, are cognizant of the level and spread of the work 
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50 - 79 
Age 
50 - 54 
Age 
55 - 59 
Age 
60 - 64 
Age 
65 - 69 
Age 
70 - 74 
Age 
75 - 79 
Lowest 351 91 81 75 59 39 27 
Second 359 97 78 71 56 36 27 
Third 382 92 85 72 59 41 25 
Fourth 450 102 100 85 72 50 28 
Highest 1,116 237 243 216 179 146 89 
Top 5% 642 136 143 125 102 90 58 
Top 1% 382 80 82 78 55 56 32 









Table 2  
Distribution of Intended/Imputed Age of Retirement 





















than 62 and 











Not Work Total 
50 - 54 14.0% 3.9% 14.4% 0.7% 3.7% 11.5% 32.0% 19.9% 100.0% 
55 - 59 9.5% 4.6% 12.5% 2.4% 5.5% 17.3% 25.8% 22.5% 100.0% 
60 - 64 2.5% 1.9% 13.2% 4.7% 5.0% 11.5% 22.4% 38.7% 100.0% 
65 - 69 0.8% 0.6% 1.0% 1.2% 5.8% 14.2% 17.1% 59.3% 100.0% 
70 - 74 0.5% 0.2% 1.4% 0.3% 0.8% 11.3% 10.0% 75.6% 100.0% 






Ages at Which Social Security Recipients Began Collecting Benefits 













U.S. Fiscal Systems and Subsystems Included in The Fiscal Analyzer 
 
1.  The U.S. Personal Income Tax  
Exemptions 
Standard vs. Itemized Deductions 
The Earned Income Tax Credit 
The Child Tax Credit 
The Alternative Minimum Tax 
Preferential Taxation of Capital Gains and Dividends 
Taxation of Social Security Benefits 
High Income Medicare Payroll and Asset-Income Taxation 
Progressive Tax Rates 
Phase Out of Deductions and Exemptions 
  2.  The FICA Tax 
  3.   Social Security Benefits 
Progressive Full Retirement Benefit (PIA) Calculation 
Married/Divorced Spousal/Widow(er), Child, Disability, and      
Retirement Benefits 
Early Retirement, Spousal, and Widow(er) Benefit Reductions 
Earnings Test and Adjustment of the Reduction Factor  
Re-computation of Benefits 
Government Pension Offset and Windfall Elimination Provision 
Delayed Retirement Credit 
Deeming 
Maximum Family Benefit  
 4.     Social Security Disability Benefits 
 5.     Supplemental Security Income 
 6.    The U.S. Corporate Income Tax 
 7.     State Income Taxes for Ohio 
 8.     State sales taxes for Ohio 
 9.     Medicare benefits 
10.   Medicaid benefits for Ohio 
11.    Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) for Ohio 
12.    Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) for Ohio 
13.    Medicare Part B Premiums 








Percentage Change in Remaining Lifetime Discretionary Spending  
If Retirement is Delayed by One Year 
 
Resource  
Quintile Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age 70-74 Age 75-79 
Lowest 2.2% 3.8% 6.2% 3.6% 4.5% 0.5% 
Second 2.4% 2.4% 3.3% 1.6% 8.0% 0.5% 
Third 2.4% 2.6% 2.6% 2.1% 8.8% 0.1% 
Fourth 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 2.6% 3.6% 1.8% 
Highest 2.0% 2.2% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 0.2% 
Top 5% 2.1% 2.4% 1.6% 1.9% 1.7% 0.4% 



















Table 6  Percentage Change in Remaining Lifetime Discretionary Spending  
If Retirement is Delayed by Five Years 
 
Resource 
Quintile Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age 70-74 Age 75-79 
Lowest 8.9% 15.0% 15.7% 14.4% 20.0% 1.9% 
Second 9.7% 8.6% 13.1% 7.3% 14.7% 1.8% 
Third 9.7% 10.2% 10.0% 8.3% 15.5% 0.2% 
Fourth 9.1% 9.6% 10.2% 9.8% 7.9% 4.5% 
Highest 8.2% 9.5% 7.6% 7.8% 7.6% 1.1% 
Top 5% 8.8% 10.4% 6.8% 7.8% 6.7% 1.5% 






















Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates by Cohort 
Resulting from a 1-Year, $1,000 Increase in Current Earnings 
Resource 
Quintile Age 50-79 Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age 70-74 Age 75-79 
Lowest 31.6% 38.0% 36.5% 32.7% 32.2% 22.3% 38.4% 
Second 39.9% 40.4% 39.6% 38.2% 38.7% 39.0% 22.0% 
Third 43.9% 41.1% 46.2% 41.6% 46.5% 47.0% 27.0% 
Fourth 49.7% 52.9% 49.6% 47.8% 51.3% 51.7% 49.1% 
Highest 56.4% 56.9% 57.0% 55.7% 56.9% 57.6% 49.6% 
Top 5% 63.1% 63.1% 64.4% 63.7% 60.4% 63.3% 55.3% 



















Table 8   
 
Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates by Cohort 
Resulting from a 1-Year, $10,000 Increase in Current Earnings 
Resource 
Quintile Age 50-79 Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age 70-74 Age 75-79 
Lowest 40.8% 52.5% 42.5% 48.1% 40.3% 29.0% 42.6% 
Second 44.1% 42.6% 39.8% 41.7% 43.1% 44.4% 28.9% 
Third 46.8% 44.6% 47.1% 43.8% 50.2% 50.7% 35.6% 
Fourth 51.3% 52.5% 50.1% 50.3% 54.2% 52.3% 52.5% 
Highest 59.3% 60.4% 60.3% 59.2% 59.8% 58.7% 52.7% 
Top 5% 65.3% 65.5% 66.7% 65.5% 65.3% 64.9% 59.3% 









Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates by Cohort 
Resulting from a 1-Year, $20,000 Increase in Current Earnings 
  
Resource 
Quintile Age 50-79 Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age 70-74 Age 75-79 
Lowest 47.8% 77.4% 53.2% 82.5% 46.5% 35.3% 43.9% 
Second 46.4% 44.2% 42.1% 45.0% 43.5% 47.1% 35.1% 
Third 48.9% 47.4% 49.3% 47.0% 51.1% 51.1% 41.5% 
Fourth 52.5% 53.4% 51.1% 52.6% 55.0% 52.7% 52.4% 
Highest 59.9% 60.4% 60.5% 58.9% 62.2% 59.7% 52.2% 
Top 5% 65.3% 65.3% 66.7% 66.0% 63.8% 65.1% 58.5% 










Table 10   
 
Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates, Age 50-79 






















Lowest 31.6% 77.4% 40.8% 82.5% 47.8% 35.3% 
Second 39.9% 44.2% 44.1% 45.0% 46.4% 47.1% 
Third 43.9% 47.4% 46.8% 47.0% 48.9% 51.1% 
Fourth 49.7% 53.4% 51.3% 52.6% 52.5% 52.7% 
Highest 56.4% 60.4% 59.3% 58.9% 59.9% 59.7% 
Top 5% 63.1% 65.3% 65.3% 66.0% 65.3% 65.1% 










Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates, Social Security Recipients, Ages 62-65 
























Lowest 28.1% 51.4% 74.7% 27.8% 47.8% 77.2% 
Second 41.5% 51.9% 56.5% 40.7% 49.6% 51.9% 
Third 41.6% 49.5% 55.1% 41.6% 45.4% 47.7% 
Fourth 49.3% 51.3% 57.4% 49.3% 51.3% 53.9% 





Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates, Social Security Recipients, Ages 62-65 























and No ARF 
Lowest 28.1% 51.4% 74.7% 26.5% 41.5% 54.7% 
Second 41.5% 51.9% 56.5% 40.8% 48.1% 49.5% 
Third 41.6% 49.5% 55.1% 45.3% 50.4% 52.3% 
Fourth 49.3% 51.3% 57.4% 47.7% 50.2% 51.9% 







Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates Assuming No Earnings or Asset Testing of Transfer Payments, Ages 50-79 



















Quintile Age 50-79 Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age 70-74 Age 75-79 
Lowest 25.8% 31.5% 30.2% 27.6% 26.0% 23.8% 23.4% 
Second 36.6% 37.8% 35.3% 34.8% 39.9% 33.7% 25.9% 
Third 41.6% 41.1% 41.0% 39.2% 46.6% 49.8% 36.2% 
Fourth 47.8% 48.6% 47.4% 45.5% 53.5% 52.3% 50.2% 
Highest 58.1% 59.0% 58.7% 57.0% 62.3% 58.0% 51.3% 
Top 5% 65.1% 65.2% 66.4% 65.1% 63.1% 66.1% 56.6% 






Marginal Lifetime Net Tax Rate - Share of Population by Range, Cohort 50-79 
Resulting from a 1-Year, $20,000 Increase in Current Earnings 
 
Quintile Below 0% 0% to 20% 21% to 30% 31% to 40% 41% to 50% 51% to 60% 61% to 80% Over 80% 
Lowest 0% 2% 15% 22% 15% 5% 7% 33% 
Second 0% 0% 5% 27% 30% 17% 8% 13% 
Third 0% 0% 3% 26% 28% 34% 3% 6% 
Fourth 0% 0% 2% 14% 29% 46% 7% 2% 








Maximum Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates 
Arising from a $20,000 increase in Current-Year Earnings 
Resource 
Quintile Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age 70-74 Age 75-79 
Lowest 301.5% 299.1% 287.7% 627.9% 226.5% 414.8% 
Second 469.5% 152.4% 208.0% 164.3% 392.0% 225.2% 
Third 136.7% 196.8% 108.2% 104.9% 272.0% 131.8% 
Fourth 105.5% 136.3% 159.2% 104.7% 60.8% 109.5% 
Highest 115.5% 156.6% 128.2% 90.0% 150.2% 95.1% 
Top 5% 115.5% 156.6% 128.2% 81.8% 150.2% 95.1% 









Minimum Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates 
Arising from a $20,000 increase in Current-Year Earnings 
Resource 
Quintile Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age 70-74 Age 75-79 
Lowest 24.7% 25.5% 22.8% 8.8% 12.3% 19.9% 
Second 14.8% 27.1% 25.3% 17.6% 21.7% 17.8% 
Third 27.9% 19.5% 24.7% 29.6% 19.3% 23.1% 
Fourth 30.3% 28.7% 28.4% 20.3% 33.8% 22.0% 
Highest 22.9% 32.5% 17.8% 17.0% 14.7% 21.2% 
Top 5% 22.9% 39.5% 23.4% 40.1% 29.5% 25.8% 






Current-Year (in Black) Versus Lifetime (in Red) Median Marginal Net Tax Rates  
(resulting from $1,000 increase in current earnings) 
Resource 
Quintile Age 50-79 Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age 70-74 Age 75-79 
Lowest 14.8% 30.4% 26.6% 23.4% 14.5% 14.4% 14.5% 
Lowest 31.6% 38.0% 36.5% 32.7% 32.2% 22.3% 38.4% 
Second 30.4% 31.0% 30.0% 30.6% 25.6% 15.3% 14.4% 
Second 39.9% 40.4% 39.6% 38.2% 38.7% 39.0% 22.0% 
Third 31.3% 31.9% 31.2% 31.1% 34.5% 31.4% 24.0% 
Third 43.9% 41.1% 46.2% 41.6% 46.5% 47.0% 27.0% 
Fourth 38.3% 39.3% 38.6% 37.3% 36.4% 39.8% 41.5% 
Fourth 49.7% 52.9% 49.6% 47.8% 51.3% 51.7% 49.1% 
Highest 39.7% 36.1% 39.2% 39.7% 41.3% 41.6% 40.7% 
Highest 56.3% 56.9% 57.0% 55.7% 56.9% 57.6% 49.6% 
Top 5% 41.4% 39.7% 39.6% 41.7% 41.6% 44.5% 42.0% 
Top 5% 63.1% 63.1% 64.4% 63.7% 60.4% 63.3% 55.3% 
Top 1% 43.7% 43.0% 44.0% 43.6% 34.5% 43.6% 45.0% 



















Average Remaining Lifetime Assets 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 50 - 79 
Debt Repayment Regular Assets Retirement Accounts Home Equity Other Equity 




Average Remaining Lifetime Income 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 50 - 79 
Employment Income Self-employment Income Other Income 




Average Remaining Lifetime Taxes 
by Resource Percentile Range,  Ages 50 - 79 
Federal Tax State Tax FICA Tax Sales Tax Corporate Tax Medicare B Premiums 




Average Remaining Lifetime Transfer Payments 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 50 - 79 











































Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Top 5% Top 1% 
Figure 2   
Median Marginal Lifetime Net Tax Rates by Percentile Range, Ages 50 - 79,  
Based on a $1,000 Increase in Earnings for 1 Year  










































Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Top 5% Top 1% 
Figure 3   
Median Marginal Lifetime Net Tax Rates by Percentile Range, Ages 50 - 79,  
Arising from a $20,000 Increase in Earnings for 1 Year 




Figure 4  
 
Distribution of Marginal Remaining Lifetime Net Tax Rates, Ages 50-79 
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Average Remaining Lifetime Assets 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 50 - 54 
Debt Repayment Regular Assets Retirement Accounts Home Equity Other Equity 




Average Remaining Lifetime Income 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 50 - 54 
Employment Income Self-employment Income Other Income 




Average Remaining Lifetime Taxes 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 50 - 54 
Federal Tax State Tax FICA Tax Sales Tax Corporate Tax Medicare B Premiums 




Average Remaining Lifetime Transfer Payments 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 50 - 54 

















Average Remaining Lifetime Assets 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 55 - 59 
Debt Repayment Regular Assets Retirement Accounts Home Equity Other Equity 




Average Remaining Lifetime Income 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 55 - 59 
Employment Income Self-employment Income Other Income 




Average Remaining Lifetime Taxes 
by Resource Percentile Range,  Ages 55 - 59 
Federal Tax State Tax FICA Tax Sales Tax Corporate Tax Medicare B Premiums 




Average Remaining Lifetime Transfer Payments 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 55 - 59 

















Average Remaining Lifetime Assets 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 60 - 64 
Debt Repayment Regular Assets Retirement Accounts Home Equity Other Equity 




Average Remaining Lifetime Income 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 60 - 64 
Employment Income Self-employment Income Other Income 




Average Remaining Lifetime Taxes 
by Resource Percentile Range,  Ages 60 - 64 
Federal Tax State Tax FICA Tax Sales Tax Corporate Tax Medicare B Premiums 




Average Remaining Lifetime Transfer Payments 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 60 - 64 


















Average Remaining Lifetime Assets 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 65 - 69 
Debt Repayment Regular Assets Retirement Accounts Home Equity Other Equity 




Average Remaining Lifetime Income 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 65 - 69 
Employment Income Self-employment Income Other Income 




Average Remaining Lifetime Taxes 
by Resource Percentile Range,  Ages 65 - 69 
Federal Tax State Tax FICA Tax Sales Tax Corporate Tax Medicare B Premiums 




Average Remaining Lifetime Transfer Payments 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 65 - 69 



















Average Remaining Lifetime Assets 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 70 - 74 
Debt Repayment Regular Assets Retirement Accounts Home Equity Other Equity 




Average Remaining Lifetime Income 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 70 - 74 
Employment Income Self-employment Income Other Income 




Average Remaining Lifetime Taxes 
by Resource Percentile Range,  Ages 70 - 74 
Federal Tax State Tax FICA Tax Sales Tax Corporate Tax Medicare B Premiums 




Average Remaining Lifetime Transfer Payments 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 70 - 74 
















Average Remaining Lifetime Assets 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 75 - 79 
Debt Repayment Regular Assets Retirement Accounts Home Equity Other Equity 




Average Remaining Lifetime Income 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 75 - 79 
Employment Income Self-employment Income Other Income 




Average Remaining Lifetime Taxes 
by Resource Percentile Range,  Ages 75 - 79 
Federal Tax State Tax FICA Tax Sales Tax Corporate Tax Medicare B Premiums 




Average Remaining Lifetime Transfer Payments 
by Resource Percentile Range, Ages 75 - 79 






 Marginal Lifetime Net Tax Rate - Share of Population by Range, Cohort 50-54 
Resulting from a 1-Year, $20,000 Increase in Current Earnings 
 
Quintile Below 0% 0% to 20% 21% to 30% 31% to 40% 41% to 50% 51% to 60% 61% to 80% Over 80% 
Lowest 0% 0% 2% 18% 13% 10% 12% 45% 
Second 0% 1% 3% 32% 34% 19% 3% 8% 
Third 0% 0% 3% 26% 33% 30% 3% 5% 
Fourth 0% 0% 1% 8% 31% 52% 6% 2% 





Marginal Lifetime Net Tax Rate - Share of Population by Range, Cohort 55-59 
Resulting from a 1-Year, $20,000 Increase in Current Earnings 
 
Quintile Below 0% 0% to 20% 21% to 30% 31% to 40% 41% to 50% 51% to 60% 61% to 80% Over 80% 
Lowest 0% 0% 3% 30% 13% 9% 12% 33% 
Second 0% 0% 3% 41% 35% 7% 2% 12% 
Third 0% 1% 2% 27% 30% 36% 0% 4% 
Fourth 0% 0% 2% 12% 36% 43% 6% 2% 








Marginal Lifetime Net Tax Rate - Share of Population by Range, Cohort 60-64 
Resulting from a 1-Year, $20,000 Increase in Current Earnings 
 
Quintile Below 0% 0% to 20% 21% to 30% 31% to 40% 41% to 50% 51% to 60% 61% to 80% Over 80% 
Lowest 0% 0% 6% 19% 8% 7% 8% 51% 
Second 0% 0% 3% 36% 28% 15% 11% 8% 
Third 0% 0% 1% 31% 25% 30% 6% 7% 
Fourth 0% 0% 0% 21% 25% 35% 13% 6% 






Marginal Lifetime Net Tax Rate - Share of Population by Range, Cohort 65-69 
                  $20,000 Increase in Current Earnings for 1 Year 
 
Quintile Below 0% 0% to 20% 21% to 30% 31% to 40% 41% to 50% 51% to 60% 61% to 80% Over 80% 
Lowest 0% 2% 18% 23% 14% 2% 9% 32% 
Second 0% 3% 5% 31% 29% 18% 7% 8% 
Third 0% 0% 1% 17% 32% 41% 7% 3% 
Fourth 0% 1% 3% 10% 15% 55% 14% 2% 







Marginal Lifetime Net Tax Rate - Share of Population by Range, Cohort 70-74 
$20,000 Increase in Current Earnings for 1 Year 
 
Quintile Below 0% 0% to 20% 21% to 30% 31% to 40% 41% to 50% 51% to 60% 61% to 80% Over 80% 
Lowest 0% 4% 31% 24% 11% 0% 3% 26% 
Second 0% 0% 16% 17% 30% 21% 9% 7% 
Third 0% 2% 9% 7% 30% 41% 6% 4% 
Fourth 0% 0% 0% 2% 33% 65% 0% 0% 
Highest 0% 1% 2% 2% 12% 35% 48% 0% 
 
 
Marginal Lifetime Net Tax Rate - Share of Population by Range, Cohort 75-79 
$20,000 Increase in Current Earnings for 1 Year 
 
Quintile Below 0% 0% to 20% 21% to 30% 31% to 40% 41% to 50% 51% to 60% 61% to 80% Over 80% 
Lowest 0% 2% 31% 12% 17% 0% 2% 36% 
Second 0% 10% 31% 26% 22% 5% 0% 6% 
Third 0% 0% 13% 34% 37% 3% 7% 5% 
Fourth 0% 0% 6% 6% 31% 51% 0% 5% 
Highest 0% 0% 10% 2% 33% 45% 8% 2% 
 
 
